One of the most common WordPress malware patterns I’ve cleaned in the last two years isn’t a webshell or a credential stealer — it’s a “fake plugin” or “fake theme.” The attacker creates a directory in wp-content/plugins/ or wp-content/themes/ with …
If a WordPress site of yours has been compromised — even briefly, even silently — there’s a very good chance it now has at least one administrator account that you didn’t create. Most WP malware families plant one as part …
Every WordPress site running with default config is being hammered right now by brute-force scripts hitting xmlrpc.php and wp-login.php. If you run multiple sites on a single OpenLiteSpeed (LSWS) box, dropping a per-site .htaccess rule on each one is …
If you run more than one WordPress site on a single server and every wp-config.php has DB_USER = 'root', your eight sites are effectively one site as far as a compromise is concerned. One vulnerable plugin on any of …
By default every WordPress install since 4.7 leaks usernames over a public, unauthenticated REST endpoint. Anyone — no login, no auth header, just a browser — can hit https://yoursite.com/wp-json/wp/v2/users and get a JSON array of every user the site considers …
You have a WordPress site that’s returning HTTP 200, the homepage renders, but something’s quietly off. WooCommerce features aren’t loading. LiteSpeed Cache settings page is empty. The Mailpoet sender isn’t sending. None of these would normally fail at the same …
One of the simplest, oldest, and still most effective WordPress compromises is a single SQL update. The attacker gets one query into your database — through any RCE, SQLi, or stolen-credential path — and runs:
UPDATE wp_options
SET option_value = 
You’re spinning up a $5/month VPS to host one or two WordPress sites. The web server choice is one of the early decisions that’s hard to undo later because the rest of your config — vhost files, cache layer, TLS …
wp-content/uploads/ is the most predictable target on a WordPress install. It’s writable by the web server (so any compromise that gets a file uploaded lands here), it’s almost never inspected by malware scanners with the same vigilance as wp-includes/, …
You clean a WordPress malware infection. You find every .php file with the suspicious signature, quarantine it, restore from backup, harden the site. Three weeks later the same backdoor is back. Same filename, same content, same behavior. You’re sure you …